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J l 1 
STATE (l]C l!TAH, 
Plu111tiff/Rccspondcnt, 
I 'l\E:l) VELAFDC, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 18976 
STNfEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a conviction of a second degree 
f ,, lony, t hcd t, in the Sec0nd ,Judie ia l District Court of Morgan 
County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of a second degree felony, theft, 
in a jury trial held before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, on 
November 16, 1982. Appellant was sentenced to a term of not less 
than one year and not more than 15 years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction on the grounds 
as set forth in the following argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1 n the early n1orning hours of October 1, 1982, Officer 
Vincent K. Nelson ot the Morgan County Sheriffs Department 
ciVi•roe<chcd '.'c•la1dc:, whc· wac; asleep in a vehicle. The 
1 ) : 1 i cl r h 1 d il; . '.'l l d t d l' q l t (_ G L ' the frisked him, and 
\,,,,i f.1111 c>lt 111 111'.. i dt11'1 Cdl. IT. 63-fi4) After confirming that 
' ; ll \' L) l l·_ J \ t 1 .\ 11 ;_r,)11. LG.::incss in S0.lt Lake Cit.y, 
Ltoh, the ofii<·t.:1 plact:C ti1. \'r,larcie LH'.dL·r t'11 
I : l c· l_, r 11 : . ! t r t [ l 
officc:r's questioning, t·lr. Vl'Liid", whn c:l the lime w"' quit•· 
intoxicated, said little. IT. 66) Mr. \lt'larde was n t l y 
charged with d second deorec· fc·lony uf thC'ft, and WdC-, lJrought lo 
trial betore the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer sittinq with <i Jury on 
November 16, 1982. 
The appellant contended at trial that he had no part in the 
theft but was merely pickec up while hitch-hiking and pi1ssed out 
in the truck which was actually stolen by the States' witness, 
John Pentz. Mr. Pentz admitted to driving the truck into Morgan, 
his place of residence, but alleged that he had been picked up by 
defendant in Salt Lake City and that defendant drove until he 
passed out on the interstate highway. (T. 43) When the Morgan 
police arrive at the truck the defendant is passed out in the 
passenger seat leaning towards the middle of the truck. (T. 71) 
The sole testimony presented by the defense was that of Mr. 
Velarde. During the cross-examination of Mr. Velarde, the 
prosecutor, over the repeilted objections of defense counsel, 
questioneC the app0l Lt1ol extensively on his clec1sion to remain 
silent after arrest, and his failure to proclaim his innocence. 
The court did not attempt to admonish the State's attorney or 
instruct the jury to disregard the questions and arguments as 
improper. 
These questions and arguments were received into evidence 
Tt1t ('1,11_;-t n0vcr 
Llllf!l llfJ\ JI d]J{i 11:Jt !11 J.'I I./,•' rkHH t() 1_:uuntcract the prc·judicia.l 
Pftect such an impl1ratinn had on the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCE, DURING BOTH CROSS-
EXl\MINATION AND ARGUMENT TO THE JURY, REGARDING 
APPELLANT'S POST ARREST SILENCE, VIOLATED 
APPELLlltJT' S FIFTH l\.MENDMENT RIGHT TO SILENCE 
AND IS A PREJUDICIAL AND THEREFORE REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
The absolute right against self-incrimination granted 
criminal defendants by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, has been solidly defined and augmented in 
numerous decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Miranda v. 
Arizona, 348 US 436, 16 LED 2d 694, 86 S Ct. 1602, (1966), the 
court held that any confession obtained during custodial 
interrogation of criminal defendants can be entered into evidence 
only if such confession was procured after meaningfully advising 
the defendant of his constitutional right to silence, followed by 
a knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights. 
The court went on to address the issue of prosecutorial 
comment on a defendant's exercise of his right to silence and 
attempts to infer guilt from such exercise. In footnote 37, the 
court said, 
"In accord with our decision today, it is 
impermissible to penalize an individual for 
exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when 
he is under pulicr interrogation. 
Tht' 1>ro:-;c.c·l1t iri11 may not, lllerelore, use at 
tn.il L11e tJC'l tl1,-it 11,0 cl()od mute or claimed 
pi-1\'llf'(_.1r in the t,i.r'{ of ac-cusat1on." 
Id <1 l 4 6 H. 
In the case of United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 71, 4':J J. J:d 
2d 99, 95 S Ct 2133 (1975), the court addressed more spPcifir,d!y 
the issue presently before this court. By affirming the 
of a defendant's conviction on the grounds that his Fifth 
Amendment rights were violated when the prosecutor on 
cross-examination asked defendant why he had not given the police 
his alibi defense when questioned, the court left no doubt that 
such prosecutorial conduct would render a defendant's Fifth 
Amendment protections a helpless facade. It is important to note 
that the reversal was affirmed, notwithstanding the courts 
instructions to the jury to disregard the improper questioning. 
The court thus held "We find that the probative value of 
respondents pre-trial silence in this case was outweighed by the 
prejudicial impact of admitting it into evidence." Id at 73. 
In these two decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear 
that reference to a defendant's proper exercise of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by the prosecutor 
was a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. 
However, the question remained unanswered of whether a prosecutor 
could comment for impeachment purposes on a defendant's failure 
to explain his innocence after waiving or partially waiving his 
Fifth Amendment right to silence. This point was resolved by the 
court in the case of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L ED 2d 91, 
96 S Ct. 2240 (1976). In this case, defendant and a co-defendant 
were arrested and charged with selling marijuana to a police 
informant. The defendant was given a miranda warninq whilP ir1 
l r:ht' ('I I I' 
]1111 1 J1'1 t t·• tr le!· 
prosecutor extensiv0ly the defendant on his failure to 
tel 1 pul ice at ti r>e '' arrest his exculpatory story. The 
µro,;ecutor, again ''vcr the r,b,jection of defense counsel, was 
pennittcu to further arqu« tit< detendant' s post-arrest silence to 
the Jury. In re'.'r,1 o;1J1g the cu11viction, the court said, "We hold 
that the use for l r 111cuchrncnl purpc·ses of pcli tioners lencc, at 
the trn11c of arr<cst ,,nd dfter receiving miranda warnings, violated 
the due process clause> of the Fourteenth 1,mendment." Id at 619. 
The Utdh Suprenre ,-iclhrcres t<:; the standard set forth in Doyle 
and in the case of State v. l'ilswell, 639 P2d 146 (Utah, 1981), 
has fortified the protection of a defendant's constitutional 
rights. In the Wiswell case, the prosecutor repeatedly attempted 
to introduce into evidence the defendant's exercise of his 
constitutional right to remain silent. Defense counsel's 
obJection were sustained on all three cross-examination questions 
as well as on the prosecutors closing argument to the jury. 
Although the trial courts attempted to rectify the improper 
references by striking the questions and admonishing the jury to 
disregard them, the appellate court reversed the conviction. In 
so deciding, the court held that 
"The continued attempts by the prosecutor to 
put the defendant's silence before the jury 
after his hav111g been advised of his right to 
remain silent amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. 
The tc dcfenc1nnt 1 s silence arc 
funddnt·r1t cl l 
t ht· l-t l: j t 
11 I·' 
t·r 1 ( 1, \\·1·,1ch hn.ve affected 
t 11,, i- et ci_1 µ r c 1 ucl i c i r:i 1 . " 
- I -
The facts of the case at bar, " '1 t l k i ,,,, l[' l 11 1 t. 
to the facts in Doyle, and t--itesf'nt cn1 even :,l1r11Hlf'I 1rq1111'1 rit 1.,1 
reversal than that of State v. Wiswell. ,t 
trial showed that at the time of arrest, Mr. Vclard(' Wd'. 
extremely intoxicated (T. 66), and his answers to questions posPd 
by the officer were short and confused, leaving doubt dH tn 
whether defendant knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment riqhts. 
The transcript of the trial shows that the prosecutor referred to 
Mr. Velarde's exercise of his Fifth amendment right no less than 
eight times, including the following exchanges: 
Question: "Mr. Velarde, on that evening, why didn't you 
tell Officer Nelson your side of the story?" (T. 92) 
Question: "And it is your position Mr. Velarde ... that you 
chose not to tell Mr. Nelson anything because you can't trust 
police officers?" (T. 94) 
Question: "So you have elected to go forward with this 
entire criminal prosecution, be arrested for vehicle theft and 
wait until today for the first time to give your version of what 
happened?" (T. 94) 
Question: "Mr. Velarde, this is the first time that ynu 
have elected to state your version of what occurred i11 Salt Lake 
County and in Morgan County, is that true?" (T. 96) (See also 
T. 92-96). 
The prosecutor further commented on the appellants exercise 
of his Fifth Amendment right to silence throughout his argument 
to the jury. This argument included th(' fol lnw1nn L1ten1e11t,; 
":-11i1! \Vl1'/ rj'J' !lt. ',/t Yidl t SlX \\lhy 
IIOl at t 11 1 • 11' Jd('nt say, I'm innocent? 
Mr. Pent; l1cHl that truck not me. You have got 
the wt·onq n"rn. I don't 0ven know how to drive 
a four-spe•·d. What's wronq with the outrage? 
My heavens, tl1c·re, according to Mr. Velarde, 
the guilty man is walking away ... Where is the 
outrage? Where is the indignation? Where is 
the sense of being victimized?" (T. 104-105) 
(Sec also T. 103-105 ancl 109-111.) 
Furthermore, although defense c0unsel repeatedly and 
vehemently obJected to these v1olat1ons of the defendant's 
constitutional rights, the court allowed the questions to stand 
and made no effort to minimize their preJudic1al effect through 
either jury admonition or jury instruction. This left defense 
counsel with the impossible task of attempting to nullify the 
prejudice through his closing argument. As the decision in State 
v. Wiswell, made clear, such conduct on the part of a prosecuting 
attorney renders the defendant void of Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment protections even where the court attempts to mitigate 
the damage. How much worse then is such misconduct when the 
court allows a prosecutor to proceed with impunity as in the 
present case? The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Miranda, 
Hale and Doyle v. Ohio, and the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
State v. Wiswell, all hold that references to the defendant's 
post arrest silence during questioning or argument to the jury, 
prejGdicial as to require a 
'iJTl\. l I tr Ii. 
Ti"" pre• Jud1c1al ct tcc:te; of the prosecutors comments 
, •11• ·1 111111(1 ,-it•!ll' 11 ant 
-fl-
obvious. In the present case, the county attorney used the 
defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights to discrf'dit 
appellants testimony, and, in fact, based his entire cloc;inq 
argument on that same constitutionally protected silence. The 
case of Doyle v. Ohio, is controlling in the case before this 
court and holds that the appellants Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to due process of the law were violated by the prosecutors 
improper use of appellants post arrest silence to impeach his 
testimony. Additionally, the case of State v. Wiswell rules 
specifically that prosecutors use of the appellants silence 
during the closing arguments to the jury was prejudicial error. 
The appellant therefore prays that this court reverse the 
lower courts decision and remand the case back to the Second 
Judicial District Court of Morgan County for proper disposition 
consistent with the appellants Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. 
- ,:;(; 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _L__ day of June, 1983. 
BARD L .AT:· \ 
Attorney for Appellant 
CJ:ITI I'IC!l'i'L ur HAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing brief to the Attorney General, 236 
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i" prepaid, this _L_ day of June, 1983. 
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